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ABSTRACT

Fake websites have emerged as a major source of online
fraud, accounting for billions of dollars of loss by Internet
users. We explore the process by which salient design
elements could increase the use of protective tools, thus
reducing the success rate of fake websites. Using the
protection motivation theory, we conceptualize a model to
investigate how salient design elements of detection tools
could influence users’ perceptions of the tools, efficacy in
dealing with threats, and use of such tools. The research
method was a controlled lab experiment with a novel and
extensive experimental design and protocol. We found
that trust in the detector is the pivotal coping mechanism
in dealing with security threats and is a major conduit for
transforming salient design elements into increased use.
We also found that design elements have profound and
unexpected impacts on self-efficacy. The significant
theoretical and empirical implications of findings are
discussed.
Keywords

protection motivation theory, experimental design,
spoofed websites, concocted websites, detection tool,
protective IT artifact
INTRODUCTION

Fake websites generate billions of dollars in fraudulent
revenue by exploiting human vulnerabilities in online
settings and are estimated to comprise nearly 20% of the
Web (Abbasi et al. 2010; Gyongyi and Garcia-Molina
2005). Fake websites are a type of semantic attack in
which attackers use meaningful content to semantically
exploit weaknesses in human nature. Semantic attacks
focus on “targeting the people” instead of exploiting
hardware and software vulnerabilities as done by many
other Internet security attacks, such as viruses, denial of
service, and malware (Schneier 2000). Users play
security-critical roles in that security failures could result
not only from attacks but also from unpredictable human
behaviors (Cranor 2008). The use of detection tools is the
most important objective in the design of such tools since
a tool that is turned off has no value in protecting users.
To this end, we use a user-centered approach in which the
relations between the critical design elements and actual
use are investigated.
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There has been little research on how salient design
elements of protective IT artifacts could influence users’
security perceptions and actual use. Previous studies (e.g.
Wu et al. 2006) have been exploratory, and provided few
theoretical insights regarding individuals’ reactions. This
paper is among the first to investigate the critical design
elements of detection tools that could influence people’s
use of such tools by asking the specific research
questions. What are the salient design elements of fake
website detection tools that most impact users’ security
perceptions and promote use? What is the process by
which the design elements alter users’ behaviors?
In formulating the conceptual model to address the
research questions, we draw on the protection motivation
theory (PMT) (Rogers 1983). A novel experimental
design, with extensive stimuli development using
carefully identified spoofed and concocted websites,
guided the data collection for this study. Our research
uncovers the process by which the salient design elements
of fake website detection tools enhance users’ coping
mechanism and increase the actual use of such tools.
This paper makes important and novel theoretical and
empirical contributions. Our work shows how detection
tools’ design elements must be enhanced and marketed to
promote their use. We found trust in the detector is the
pivotal coping mechanism in dealing with security threats
posed by fake websites and is a major conduit for
transforming users’ perceptions of design elements into
their increased use of such tools. Elements that boost
users’ trust are critical factors in the design of detection
tools. We also found that design elements have profound
and unexpected impacts on users’ self-efficacy, which
indicates the potential presence of an ego-enhancing role
for protective IT artifacts. Accuracy emerged as the most
important design element that impacted trust in the tool,
and its actual use. Our work shows how this primary
feature of the tool operates on users’ psychological
mechanisms to change their perceptions and behaviors.
THEORETICAL
DEVELOPMENT

BACKGROUND

AND

MODEL

To identify the salient design elements for fake website
detection tools and understand user reactions to such
tools, we need to look into users’ cognitive process of
detecting deceptions when such tools are in the place.
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According to the fraud deception theory (FDT), a
deception involves two parties with conflicting interests, a
deceiver and a target. The deceiver uses deceptive tactics
to manipulate and misrepresent cues of a situation which
depart from the truth, to induce a misjudgment by the
target. The target, therefore will behave in accordance
with the deceiver’s manipulations and misrepresentations
(Johnson et al. 2001). To successfully detect deceptions,
individuals need to detect the inconsistencies between the
cues manipulated and the truth. The FDT suggests a fraud
detection method based on the competence model of
successful detections that can assist an individual’s
cognitive process of fraud detection. Effective fake
detection tools need to facilitate individual’s cognitive
process in arousing suspicion(s) about abnormalities,
generating and evaluating hypotheses on deceptions, and
reaching a conclusion on the legitimacy of a site (Johnson
et al. 2001). Two broad categories of design element can
facilitate such cognitive process, performance elements
and user interface elements of detection tools.
Performance elements play a critical role in activating
users’ fraud detection cognitive process before they fall
into deceiver’s manipulations; user interface elements
communicate the findings of the tool and help users detect
manipulated and misrepresented cues and then heed the
tool’s warnings. This paper is part of a larger federallyfunded research project that investigates both
performance design and user-interface design of fake
website-detection tools. In this paper, we report on the
performance-related design elements of such tools. (The
research on the user-interface elements of detection tools
is currently underway.) Based on the literature and the
FDT theory, we have identified four categories of salient
design elements, detector’ accuracy and run time, cost of
detector error, type of threat (spoofed and concocted), and
domain.
Self-Protective Behavior Research

There are theories for explaining how individuals can be
motivated to protect themselves from harm. Protection
motivation theory (PMT) (Rogers 1983) is the most wellknown in security research and has demonstrated
significant explanatory power in predicting security
behaviors (e.g. Anderson and Agarwal 2010; Chen and
Zahedi 2009; Johnson and Warkentin 2010). PMT posits
that humans’ protective behaviors involve two cognitive
processes—threat appraisal and coping appraisal. The
principal variables in the threat appraisal process are the
perceived susceptibility to the threat (a perception about
the extent of vulnerability to the threat) and the perceived
severity of the threat (a perception about the magnitude of
possible harm of the threat if no countermeasures are
taken). The primary constructs in the coping appraisal
process are response efficacy (a belief in the effectiveness
of the countermeasure), self-efficacy (a belief in one’s
own ability in taking the countermeasure), and perceived
cost of adoption (a perception about the amount of effort,
time, and money needed for adopting the countermeasure)
(Rogers 1983). PMT proposes that when individuals
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appraise the threat by assessing the susceptibility to and
severity of the threat, and are confident in their coping
ability (in terms of response efficacy, self-efficacy, and
coping cost), they tend to take protective action against
the threat.
Model and Hypotheses Development

In order to investigate the impact of the salient design
elements, we propose the detection tool impact (DTI)
model, as shown in Figure 1.
Coping Appraisal

Perception of
Detector

Trust in the
detector

H7

Detector
usefulness

H11
H6
-

H5

Elements:
-Detector accuracy
-Detector time delay
-Type of threat
-Cost of damage

Detector
effort
requirement

Self efficacy
in dealing
with Threat

H4
-

Actual
use of the
detector

H10

H9
H3
-

Threat Appraisal
H8

Loss due to
detector
error

H2

Threat
severity

H1

Threat
susceptibility

Control variables:
Past encounters with fake
websites
Security habit
Age
Education
Gender
Familiarity with domain
Familiarity with websites

Figure 1. Detector Tool Impact (DTI) Model

This is a user-centric assessment of how the detection tool
design could change the usage of the system. In this
model, the manipulations of design elements form users’
perceptions of the detector, which in turn impact users’
cognitive processes—threat appraisal and coping
appraisal and then actual use of the tool. The arguments
for model conceptualization were not included here due to
the space limitation. The model hypotheses are reported
below.
H1. Users’ perceived loss due to detector error is
positively associated with their perceived threat
susceptibility.
H2. Users’ perceived loss due to detector error is
positively associated with their perceived threat severity.
H3. Perceived loss due to detector error is negatively
associated with users’ self-efficacy in dealing with fake
website threats.
H4. Detector effort requirement is negatively associated
with users’ self-efficacy in dealing with fake website
threats.
H5. Detector usefulness is positively associated with
users’ self-efficacy in dealing with fake website threats.
H6. Perceived loss due to detector error will have a
negative effect on users’ trust in the detector.
H7. Detector usefulness is positively associated with
users’ trust in the detector.
H8. Users’ perceived threat susceptibility is positively
associated with the extent of their detector use.
H9. Users’ perceived threat severity is positively
associated with the extent of their detector use.
H10. Users’ perceived self-efficacy is positively
associated with the extent of their detector use.
H11. Users’ trust in the detector is positively associated
with the extent of their detector use.
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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

The research methodology was controlled lab experiment.
We chose this methodology in order to examine the actual
behaviors of individuals in using the detector. The
experimental design was a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2=16 full-factorial
design. The detection tool (DT) stimuli varied in design
elements: accuracy, run time, type of threat, and loss due
to detection error. Each design element had two levels:
the DT accuracy was high vs. low (90% vs. 60%), the
detection run time was fast vs. slow (1 vs. 4 seconds), the
type of threat was either spoofed or concocted, the loss
due to the detection error was high vs. low ($10 vs. $1).
The values of all manipulations were determined by the
suggestions from literature (e.g. Abbasi et al. 2010).

In the post-experiment survey, participants were asked to
assess the detection time and accuracy and the cost of
making one wrong decision, which we manipulated
during the experiment, based on what they had
experienced in the experiment. The results of the
ANOVA tests supported the success of manipulation.

The experimental protocol was to mimic real conditions
of use. We chose the sensitive context of online
pharmacy. An inventory of 15 spoofed, 15 concocted,
and 15 legitimate online pharmacies was identified. A
detection tool simulated the performance of fake websitedetection based on one of the 16 possible designs. The
designs were randomly assigned to the participants. The
participants were randomly assigned 5 legitimate and 5
fake (either spoofed or concocted) websites.
The
experimental task was to buy an over-the-counter drug
with a value of about $30 (Rogaine, a hair regrowth
product, for grandpa). This product was chosen because it
is relevant and familiar. For each website, the participants
had to decide if they would visit the website, and once on
the website, the participants had to decide if they would
explore the website to find the product and, once found, if
they would buy the product. Incentives and/or
disincentives are also important factors to motivate
human beings to take the proper security actions when
they are in the security loop (Cranor 2008). The
participants were therefore awarded based on their
performance. The final performance score for each
participant was computed based on all their decisions
regarding 10 assigned websites. Payments were made in
cash (gift card) or course credits based on each
participant’s preference. The participants took an online
survey before and after the experiment.
All the scales for the study were also adopted from
literature and modified for the current study. All items
were converted to have semantic differential scales to
ensure content validity and reduction of the threat of
common method variance (Podsakoff et al. 2003). The
instrument and corresponding references were not
included due to space limitations.
The experiment protocol and the instrument were
pretested and pilot-tested. 437 participants from students
in undergraduate and graduate programs in a large
Midwestern university participated in the experiment.
Average age of participants was 22.4 years, with 64%
male and 36% female.

We carried out exploratory factor analyses (EFA) to
check the convergent and discriminant validity of the
constructs. All measurement items emerged and correctly
loaded on the corresponding constructs. All item loadings
are greater than 0.70, and no cross loadings are greater
than 0.40. By comparing the square root of the AVE for
each construct with its correlations with all other
constructs, we checked for further evidence of the
discriminant validity of the constructs. The square root of
AVE for each construct was greater than the correlation
values with other constructs. All together, the convergent
and discriminant validity were supported.
Measurement Model

The measurement model was estimated by using the
mean-adjusted maximum likelihood (MLM) method in
Mplus. MLM adjusts the estimation for the non-normality
in data. As shown in Table 1, all fit indices were better
than recommended thresholds, indicating a good fit for
the measurement model.
Fit Index

Measurement

DTI

Threshold

Normed χ2

1.31

1.61

<3.0

CFI

0.992

0.973

>0.90

TLI

0.990

0.970

>0.90

RMSEA

0.027

0.037

<0.06

SRMR

0.028

0.072

<0.10

Table 1. Measurement and Casual Model Fit Indexes
Model Estimation

We used the MLM method in Mplus to estimate the DTI
model. As shown in Table 1, all the fit indices of the DTI
model were better than the recommended thresholds,
indicating good model fit and supporting for our
theoretical model. Of the 11 hypotheses in the DTI
model, 9 were statistically significant (Hypotheses H8 and
H9 were not supported), confirming our theoretical
conceptualization.
DISCUSSION

The experiment design and execution proved to be
successful in manipulating participants’ perceptions about
the detection tool, thus allowing the estimation of the
conceptual model in order to examine how the design
elements could change users’ perceptions and behaviors
regarding detecting fake websites. Our results indicated
that users form their perception of the detector’s
usefulness based on its accuracy, which, in turn, plays a
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major role in forming users’ trust in the detector. Run
time and cost due to detector error have far smaller roles
in users’ perception of the detector’s attributes.
Trust in the detector emerged as the single most pivotal
factor in linking detection tools’ design elements (H6 and
H7) to use behaviors (H11). Positive perception about
detectors (usefulness) arises from detectors’ accuracy and
has the single most profound influence on trust (path
coefficient of 0.89, p<0.001), whereas loss due to detector
error has a small negative influence (-0.07, p<0.01). This
shows that forming and promoting positive perceptions
about detectors are critical in developing users’ trust,
which, in turn, promotes use. Given the fact that people
generally are not good at detecting deceptions (Biros et al.
2002), we believe users can substantially benefit from
developing trust in detectors that they find useful. Our
findings further support the importance of giving proper
consideration to design elements (such as detection
accuracy) that “calibrate” human trust in protective IT
artifacts (Parasuraman and Miller 2004) to promote trust
in and use of protective IT artifacts.
Loss due to detector error has a small negative influence
on trust in the detector. Its most damaging impacts are on
users’ self-efficacy and threat appraisal, particularly on
threat susceptibility. These findings indicate that the
detector’s negative attributes, while perceived as
contributing to threat and reducing users’ self-efficacy in
taking security countermeasures to deal with the threat,
may not play a significant role in user behavior so long as
the tool is perceived as useful and, hence, trustworthy due
to its positive design elements.
Our results highlighted and supported numerous previous
findings that self-efficacy is an important salient
construct. However, most IS studies treat self-efficacy as
an exogenous variable and do not examine forces
contributing to its change, either positively or negatively.
Our work shows that detectors’ positive attributes
increase self-efficacy (H5), and detectors’ negative
attributes reduce self-efficacy (H3). This is an interesting
finding since it indicates that users make a connection
between the “ability” of an IT artifact and their own
ability. When perceived loss due to detector error is high,
users lower their perception of self-efficacy (H3); when
perceived detector usefulness is high, they increase their
perception of self-efficacy (H5). This is a novel finding
since it shows that the detector has the potential to merge
with users’ ego and to become part of their selfperception—“I have more ability since I have a more
powerful tool.” This has the potential to blur the
boundary of the self and the IT protective artifact.
This finding becomes even more interesting when we
consider the unexpected result for effort requirement.
The detector’s effort requirement is another negative
attribute. Its impact was not as hypothesized in H4. We
had hypothesized a negative impact on self-efficacy,
whereas its impact turned out to be significant but
positive. The inconvenience of waiting for a few seconds
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and the cognitive effort of reading and deciding about the
warning message were not an issue for users in our
sample. Instead, the effort provided users with a sense of
increased self-efficacy. It seems that seeing the detector
in operation gave users a higher sense of control and
power in dealing with the fake website threat. Again, the
boundary of self and the detector becomes blurred in this
interpretation since the effort is accepted as an egoenhancing process in the fight against the fraud
perpetrated by fake websites. This also explains why trust
in the detector plays such an important role. Trust by
definition indicates a close relationship in which the
trustor is willing to become vulnerable to the trustee’s
actions and accept the trustee’s actions without
verification. It raises the question of whether protective
IT artifacts are perceived as extensions of users’ self and
own ability. Does the artifact become the “Iron Man’s
armor” to give him super power?
Finally, we examined the DTI model with two types of
fake website threat: spoofed and concocted. The findings
of the estimated model remain the same in both types of
threat, indicating the generalizeability of the DTI model.
IMPLICATIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE
DIRECTIONS
This paper makes a number of novel contributions to
theory and practice. First, using the theoretical lens in
designing IT protective artifacts opens a new avenue of
research. Second, this study addressed the call for
research in the relationship between trust and the IT
artifact in general and the relationship between trust and
the detection system assisting users to detect online
deceptions in particular (Gefen et al. 2008). Our
investigation uncovered the pivotal role of trust in the
artifact as the conduit between design elements and their
eventual impacts. When designing protective IT artifacts,
designers should give proper consideration to design
elements regarding the trust “calibration” process
(Parasuraman and Miller 2004).
Third, our findings
uncovered the ways that users’ perceptions of design
elements and artifact attributes influence their selfefficacy by either enhancing or diminishing their sense of
personal ability to cope with the threat of fake websites.
Users may view protective IT artifacts as an extension of
their self, thus reinforcing the need to combine the design
science approach with behavioral theories to fit protective
IT artifacts to individuals’ psychology in order to promote
users’ trust and use. Fourth, this study contributes to
design science research by proposing and empirically
testing the DTI model by which design science scholars
can test and evaluate various design elements of
protective IT artifacts. Finally, our findings indicated that
the main focus of research in designing protective IT
artifacts should be on coping mechanisms and not on the
appraisal of threat and fear. This increases the parsimony
of model conceptualization for designing protective IT
artifacts.

Proceedings of the Tenth Annual Workshop on HCI Research in MIS, Shanghai, China, December 4, 2011
4

Zahedi et al.

This study has limitations. We collected our data for one
context—online pharmacies.
Therefore, our results
should be interpreted within this context. Our participants
interacted with the detection tool stimuli that were not
embedded in an Internet browser or running as a real-time
system. This could be considered a limitation. However,
our stimuli closely imitated main features of existing
detection tools while eliminating specifics of a brand
name. Thus, participants had a unified experiment
platform and, consequently, variances due to participants’
varying experiences and knowledge of specific tools were
removed. Further, this study was conducted with
undergraduate and graduate students. Although
undergraduate and graduate students represent a large
proportion of Internet users, care must be taken in
generalizing our findings to other populations.
This paper is part of a larger, federally-funded project in
this area that involves the investigation of user-interface
elements, multiple contexts, and personalization through
intelligent user interface. Additionally, this paper has
proposed a number of avenues for building theories that
combine the strength of design science and behavioral
science in creating compelling personalized protective IT
artifacts. Another direction of future research is the use
of the DTI model in examining the design elements for
other protective IT artifacts. Given the strong empirical
support for the relationship between trust in the detector,
it might be promising for future research to study how
trust in protective IT artifacts is extended to the Internet.
Finally, other Internet usage domains, particularly
hedonic domains such as online games and social
networking, could be explored in future research. It is
possible that the impacts of the detector in hedonic
domains will be different from those in utilitarian
domains such as the online pharmacy employed in this
study.
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